A Defense of Berkelean Idealism: How Size is not Objective

Introduction:

Berkeley's idealism is a response to epistemological theories of the mind proposed by contemporary philosophers David Hume and John Locke, who propose the mind operates on an imagistic model, meaning the mind works off of perceptions more than anything else. His work was primarily concerned with criticizing indirect realism, which defends there is a truly independent and objective world which our imperfect perceptions cannot fully apprehend so thus our perceptual world, the one we live in, is an interpretation or representation of the truly objective. He does this by adopting a theory of idealism debunking the notion of an objective world and instead advancing that our perceptual world is actually wholly dependent on the mind. This article will outline a criticism toward's Berkeley's account of shape, where he argues shape is not an objective quality of objects because an object's size is dependent on the perspective it's seen from. I outline how this point is inefficient in defending Berkeley's theory, and provide a counter-argument which aims to challenge a conventional understanding of size while maintaining Berkeley's theory. I explain how size depends on the scale of measurement and why measurements cannot provide evidence of true size; thereby maintaining the mind-dependence of shape by eliminating the notion that it is objective in any way.

In A Treatise Concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge (1710), and Three Dialogues between Hylas and Philonous (1713), referred to as Three Dialogues from here on, Berkeley approaches each of the qualities which objects are known to have and poses arguments for how they don't inhere within the objects themselves but rather in the mind of the observer. These qualities were detailed by John Locke in his An Essay Concerning Human Understanding (1690), where each object is given primary qualities, which inhere within the object itself, and secondary qualities, which depend on the situation of the observer. The primary qualities including size, shape, and weight; while the secondary qualities include colour, taste, and smell. Berkeley's goal is to show how each of the primary qualities depends on the mind, rather in these objects, so he can advance his own idealism. 

Confusing Apparent and Actual Size:

If you look up toward a visible moon you could fit the moon, in its apparent entirety, between your fingers and thumb, yet we know that's not representative of the moon's actual size (1737.1 kilometres in radius). The average human hand is 7.2 inches in length, much too small to contain the true size of the moon between its fingers. This occurs because of the distance between the moon and your hand, making the apparent size of the moon from your perspective small enough to fit between your fingers.

Berkeley uses this fact to argue that size is not objective since an objects size depends on the position from which you observe it. This can be found in Three Dialogues (p.13), where the protagonist Philonous exposes, what he believes to be, a contradiction in Hylas' judgement that the true size of an insect's foot is the size which the insect sees, a human sees and what every animal would see despite those sizes all appearing different due to their differing physical perspectives. If the sizes do indeed appear different, and they are all the true size of the insect's foot, he argues; then it can't possibly be the case that the insect's foot has a fixed, inherent size. Berkeley has written the character of Hylas to be an advocate of the physicalist theories he argues against and Philonous is the expositor of his own ideas. This exchange seeks to shows the absurdity of the physicalist's claim that an object has a fixed size, yet it would appear Philonous is conflating actual and apparent size with each other.

This mix-up is later addressed in the same text when Hylas has the following to say: "... Granted that large and small consist merely in the relation other extended things have to the parts of our own bodies, and so aren’t really in the substances themselves; still, we don’t have to say the same about absolute extendedness, which is something abstracted from large and small, from this or that particular size and shape..." (p.15). This part of the text touches upon a different key aspect of Berkeley's theory. Philonous retorts to Hylas that "everything which exists is particular" (p.16), so if absolute extendedness (size) exists it must be particular and have qualities, but since absolute extendedness is removed from any such qualities it can't be reasoned to exist. Thus, notions of an objects actual size are to be discredited under false premises. Berkeley appears to have multiple answers to this single point (a characteristic of his works as a whole) and I aim to show how this point specifically does not falter despite this apparent flaw.

The difficulty in Philonous' explanation about the insect's foot arises when we consider principle of measurements. It can very easily be criticized by stating that the size of the insect's foot is still indeed fixed, and it is rather the difference in distance of the perceiver that's causing the apparent discrepancy in size, just like the earlier example of the moon. The apparent size and the actual size is different. While the apparent size can change, the foot does have an actual size which is a fixed value. Thus, in this moment, Philonous appears to be confused about this distinction, citing the apparent size of the foot to be evidence that it doesn't an actual fixed size.

I will now propose a counter argument to show how this doesn't threaten the argument made by Philonous.

The Matter of Scale and the Lack of Evidence of Absolute Size:

The actual size of any object, moon or insect foot, is very difficult if not impossible to obtain. Scientific methods of measurement use standard units which can all be converted between each other. 1 kilometre is 1,000 metres and each metre is 3.28084 feet, making 1 kilometre 3280.84 metres in magnitude. Despite the different units used they each represent the same total space. We can get more accurate results by increasing the number of decimal places, though its generally unnecessary to do so without cause. By convention, we round to a number found to be most relevant to the style of measurement, some examples of which include: counting decimal places, rounding to the nearest whole number, or establishing a relevant number of significant digits to use. The difference between 1 centimetre and 1.0002 centimetres is too insignificant of a change, so, by convention, we would simply use 1cm instead. But, if we are using the most precise measuring instruments, 1.0002cm would be the more accurate measurement in an ideal world where margins of error don't exist (which we can assume is the case of the truly objective world, proposed by indirect realism). We must acknowledge that the two values listed above are indeed two different numbers, but due to convention the practical notation of "1cm" would imply a margin of error between the measurement of "1cm" and the next unit on the measuring tool, such as 1 millimetre (mm) used on conventional school-grade rulers. We can develop this point by considering even smaller units of measurement, getting more precise with smaller units to get a more accurate account of any object's size. It's theoretically possible to continue this ad infinitum, though this is practically impossible. Thus, the actual size of any object cannot be known in this manner and we have no real evidence objects have an "actual size".

An alternate method which some might argue would be to count the number of atoms and the space between them to get the most accurate representation of an object's true size. This would involve measurements on the quantum level, wherein the locations of subatomic particles become probabilities due to the wave-particle effect where any particle can be described either as a particle or wave. Waves themselves are spread out across many points in space and cannot be singled out to any one specific point. This suggests, on a small enough scale, the precise location of particles become a probability rather than determinate, thus the exact locations cannot be determined on scales this small. This doesn't provide any evidence that objects have truly objective and fixed sizes and are thus still dependent on something other than an independent objective reality. Heisenberg's Uncertainty Principle, detailed in a paper titled Über den anschaulichen Inhalt der quantentheoretischen Kinematik und Mechanik (1927:1977), translated to The Actual Content Of Quantum Theoretical Kinematics And Mechanics, states that it is not possible to know both the exact location of a particle alongside it's momentum due to the limitations of the precision of measurements. This limitation, I believe, supports the claim that there is no evidence objects have fixed sizes.

A possible counter-point to my argument is to consider an objects size at an individual moment of time rather than across the length of time taken to perform the measurement. If we eliminate change, then it would be possible to get an exact account of the location of every particle, and the distance between, within an object, and thus get an accurate size of it in that one "snapshot" taken out of time. I would argue that in this "snapshot", on a quantum level the particles involved would still exhibit wave-like behavior and thus still have no fixed position, therefore the object itself would still have no fixed size.

Conclusion:

With my counter argument out of the way, I must state that, while I have studied physics at university level, including modules on quantum mechanics, I am not well versed or comfortable in my knowledge of the topic to provide more precise details of the wave-particle duality or Heisenberg's Uncertainty Principle, so my scientific accounts are lacking in detail. However from a philosophical perspective I feel I have represented my current thoughts well enough to satisfy its purpose for this article.

I believe this resolves the issue Berkeley wrote into Philonous' account of size by showing that, even if Berkeley did confuse actual and apparent size with each other (which, as established, wouldn't actually discredit his overall theory), his conclusion in the Three Dialogues still holds on the basis that an object's actual size doesn't depend on a possible objective counterpart as objects have no fixed sizes because of the sheer impossibility of measuring it, and we have no evidence to believe actual size even exists externally of the mind.

References & Bibliography:

Berkeley, G. Three Dialogues between Hylas and Philonous (1713), in the version presented at www.earlymodernexts.com [Accessible at: https://www.earlymoderntexts.com/assets/pdfs/berkeley1713.pdf] [last Accessed: 16:44 09/05/2020]
Berkeley, G. The Principles of Human Knowledge (1710), in the version presented at www.earlymoderntexts.com [Accessible at: https://www.earlymoderntexts.com/assets/pdfs/berkeley1710.pdf] [Last Accessed: 16:46 09/05/2020]

Heisenberg, W., The Actual Content Of Quantum Theoretical Kinematics And Mechanics (1983). Washington, D.C.: National Aeronautics and Space Administration. Translated into English from Z. fuer Phys. (West Germany), v. 43, no. 3-4, 1927 p 172-198

Locke, J. Essay Concerning Human Understanding (1690), in the version presented at www.earlymoderntexts.com [Accessible at: https://www.earlymoderntexts.com/assets/pdfs/locke1690book2.pdf] [Last Accessed: 16:48 09/05/2020]

Wynn Entry #5: The Ethereal Chaos: Mist of Perception

The Ethereal Chaos: Mist of Perception

You and I have senses. We can perceive our surroundings and even the people around us, who can subsequently perceive us, too. However, a recent philosophy activity I did as revision for a philosophy exam earlier today got me thinking about something that, frankly, seems rather absurd at first glance.


What happens between being perceived?
The Ethereal Chaos is the made-up place where everything not currently being witnessed by your own senses "go", while you aren't sensing them. At the time of writing this, you readers are currently inside said Ethereal Chaos from my perspective because I cannot sense you. However, at the same time, I am also in the Ethereal Chaos from your perspective since you cannot sense me; you only sense this blog as something I left behind.
Where do you think this blog entry came from? The mind of a semi-intelligible person currently studying philosophy at university somewhere in the United Kingdom? Nay, I say. It came from the Ethereal Chaos and manifested itself right before your eyes when you noticed it from a similarly chaotic-borne part of the internet with whose arrangement of pixels was also pulled from the same Ethereal Chaos.
Being a strong believer in subjectivity, I am inclined to support a view which says the object being looked at in this example enters the Ethereal Chaos when I can no longer sense it, but remains within your perception while you look at it. Likewise, when you stop perceiving the object and can no longer sense it, it enters the Ethereal Chaos of your perception, even though I am currently perceiving it myself.
This seemingly does not account for what 'actually' happens by the conventional view. The object doesn't physically fall into a bubbly broil called the Ethereal Chaos when I am not looking at it. Instead, anything that happens to the object while I am not looking at it might as well be random up until the point where I re-observe it, provided it is truly hidden to me, and from there I deduce what happened to it while inside the ethereal chaos.
As an example, when I look at the pencil on my mothers desk this morning I notice its sharp lead point. The following day, I re-observe it and notice the tip is duller and the pencil has moved. From that it is easy to surmise that the changes it underwent while within the "Ethereal Chaos" were that it was used and its tip was dulled, presumably by her.
The Ethereal Chaos doesn't seek to account for the changes that you re-observe. Rather, it provides a model for things changing that you either will never know about, or changes made up until the point where you deduce correctly, or find out for certain, how it was changed. In the pencil example, I can deduce to a certain precision what happened without much extra thought. But there is also a non-zero chance the pencil was replaced with a similar pencil with a duller tip because my mother lost the old one and had to use a replacement during the time I was not aware of.

1. It is a metaphysical place that any one specific subjective personality cannot ever see, and it is the metaphysical place where everything that cannot currently be sensed by the subjective personality goes to.

1. Anything within the Ethereal Chaos changes chaotically while inside of it, except things you have seen before. Such things instead undergo minor changes to account for the length of time you spent not observing it, however it remains very clearly consistent with what you expect said thing to be.

1. The longer something stays within the Ethereal Chaos, the more that thing changes.

1. It is also a place where things can be randomly created, along with anything that makes it consistent within the universe, yet it only creates things that doesn't conflict with what is expected. (for instance, you reasonably expect that your friends and family remember you after you haven't seen them for any amount of time.)

1. It is a thing that is entirely consistent with everything that we know about the universe, yet we cannot ever observe it or be sure of its existence.

As I was on the train home, I looked at everyone around me and considered: "All these people have their own perspective and their own life. When I am no longer able to sense them, as is the case when they are not in eyesight or earshot of me, and I can't meaningfully connect something around me to the existence of one of those individuals. It is as though they disappear from my world until I were able to sense them again."

Apart from sounding like a borderline anti-social thought, it got me to think. If someone were to ask me "does this individual, who you're likely never going to see again, cease to exist when you aren't sensing them?" I would respond what anyone else would with the obvious "Of course not." (unless I wanted to express what I am expressing in this blog entry or attempt to confuse them), it isn't clear why that is undeniably the case.

Consider the situation from an innocent bystander's perspective. let’s call them 'you'.

If you were on the same train carriage as me on my way home earlier today, you would be far more concerned about more relevant matters in your life than even notice me thinking about the state of your existence. Because, to you, I might as well have ceased to exist when we part from the rocking and densely packed train carriage. For all your sensations can discern after that point, I seem to have only existed at that point. I might as well have vanished from existence from your perspective. It is only until we happen upon each other again do I seem to have changed, provided you notice.

Now I move onto the title of this entry. As a mental exercise, I started to think of this metaphysical entity called the Ethereal Chaos to provide a silly little account for this. I should preface this by saying that I do not actually think something like this scientifically exists, it is simply a name used to refer to an idea.

This is not to say the Ethereal Chaos exists psychically. It would be absurd for me to respond that things stop existing when they're outside of my perception. Rather it is an exercise in thought to figure out more about the world we sense, and a fun mental exercise for myself and, hopefully, for you all as well.

But there are obvious problems with this idea. I may stop looking at something only for someone else to start looking at it. Surely then that thing is where it was last seen, and will be when someone else looks at it, provided it hasn't been moved. It can't be in the Ethereal Chaos with someone constantly observing it.



What is the Ethereal Chaos:

So far, the Ethereal Chaos has these aspects.:


Point 1 sets the groundwork. The Ethereal Chaos is where anything that is not currently being sensed by us disappears to. If we were to see it, it would disappear instantly since it's defined as being outside of perception.

Point 2, I reckon, is a little contentious. We have no basis to say the Ethereal Chaos changes things when we're not looking at them. Though I think we do, simply on the basis that the pencil has changed when I look at it later. While it had to have been observed for it to change - my mother would've used it somehow - it is still outside my subjective perception. Likewise, anything she sees in my room and looks at later on would have entered her Ethereal Chaos and I would have somehow changed the object, for instance, by moving it.

I say things within changes chaotically because for something to be truly outside of our senses I mean we have no way to detect it, neither directly nor indirectly. This includes by the intellect. If something is not apprehended by neither the intellect or the senses, then anything may potentially happen to the object and to us it would seem random or chaotic.

Point 3 is quite logical. The longer something is exposed to elements that can change it, the higher the chance of it being changed.

To make point 4 more understandable, imagine planning a trip to a luxurious Greek island you've never been to before. You look it up online and find reviews and pictures of the area to get a good idea of the place before you go. When you arrive you see the locations in the pictures, as well as a plethora of other details such as specific people, specific insects and specific experiences.

These specific details you experience, and could only experience by going yourself, are extremely hard to predict. So much so, that I say it might as well be random. You my argue that with enough information you'd be able to predict as much as possible, even down to the minutia listed above. And I agree with you.

But I don't see it as a problem with the notion of the Ethereal Chaos because in the very act of gathering information and researching you get closer and closer to certainty. The closer you are to certainty, the less randomness can seemingly happen, and thus the more the Ethereal Chaos is peeled back to reveal the details.
There will always be things that you won't be able to predict. For instance, whether you get into an accident, get an illness, or even what specific thoughts you will have waking up one morning on vacation. These things constitute the "random things" I mean when they are spawned from the Ethereal Chaos.

The limit to this point lies in the fact that the universe is somehow consistent in that it incredibly likely won't do anything that is contradictory to the things that have already happened. For example, it won't suddenly place a live Tyrannosaurus Rex on the island or summon Zeus from Mount Olympus. This is because the dinosaurs are known to have become exist, thus the Ethereal Chaos won't "put" one there and Zeus won't come down from Mount Olympus because he is parts of myths and legends rather than the modern day physical world. The universe must remain consistent to some degree. After all, if we knew all of the universe's consistencies already, there would be nothing left to discover.

Thus, for as long as we have room to discover new things, the Ethereal Chaos can spawn seemingly random things in new, never-before-seen territories of the physical and mental world.

Lastly, point 5 is mostly an extension of what I discussed in the last paragraph of point 4. The universe is consistent in some respects which allows us to develop physical laws and psychological models to predict human behavior.

The purpose of this blog post is to highlight a strange way of possibly understanding the world. While many adopt the scientific standard model of the world being the way it is, namely that it is physical and consistent, I believe there is so much more to the universe than what science can predict. This is where the Ethereal Chaos stands in, as a representation for our ignorance, either intentional or unintentional. When we aren't able to sense something subjectively, and "sense" here should be understood similarly to something we can perceive physically or intellectually, it leaves our realm of awareness and understanding and occupies a metaphysical realm characterized by the absence of these facets of us. Sure, if I am not observing a glass and someone else is, if the glass is truly un-observable by me it still exists within my Ethereal Chaos despite it staying within the other person's perception.

Let me know what you all think about this idea. Is it tenable philosophically, and what does it inspire you to think about, if anything? Feel free to comment on this post with your responses and thoughts. I am eager to hear them all!

Wynn's Entry #4: What do we mean by "What is the Meaning of Life?"

What do we Mean by "The Meaning of Life?"

Recently I have had the pleasure of writing an assignment regarding the meaning of life. While this assignment asked whether the transient nature of time makes life meaningless, and that I royally screwed up the conclusion section of said assignment, it none-the-less made me consider what we want to know when we ask the question “What is the Meaning of Life?” There seems to be some sort of emotion which communicates something the words do not in that question. Perhaps the one who asks this is looking for a purpose. Or perhaps they are just making sure we do have free will and humanity isn't just some pawn being manipulated by some greater being.

So in this post I will provide an interpretation of what we might mean by the word “meaning”, state my personal opinion based on this new interpretation, and give an explanation as to why we might take issue with questioning the meaning of life.

The Connotation of Meaning

So, the dictionary definition of the word meaning can provide us with some foundation of what the word means. However the dictionary definitions rarely communicate the connotation a word might have when it is used in the English language. It’s important that we understand a word’s definition is different to the word’s connotation. By connotation, I am referring to the ideas and feelings one may experience when using a certain word to convey meaning.

Let us take the connotation of the word “meaning” as to provide a subjective sense of deeming something as having a satisfying reason as its purpose. In other words, I suggest that meaning is found in something, only if the explanation of that thing’s purpose is deemed satisfactory to you on a subjective, emotional and/or logical level. By this, as long as it provides this feeling (the feeling of “it feels right”) to you in any form, you can accept the explanation as something’s meaning.

In consideration of this, I talked to some friends and colleagues who stated their opinion on what gives their life meaning. One friend, who is seemingly content in their position in life right now, initially made witty remarks in response to it, but as the conversation continued, deeper ideas and beliefs began to show up until a meaning for their life was articulated. Another friend, endlessly critical, stated their disapprobation at the lack of convincing explanations for the meaning of life in a more objective sense and was critically analysing the former’s given answer, stating inconsistencies via examples, to which the other seemed to become disquieted by this.

It appears they took two different approaches to the meaning of life in this case. They either questioned up until a certain point, to which they find unappealing to question any further, for whatever reason it is and adopt it as their view; or they question everything and find themselves in an uncomfortable situation in which they may feel out of place and see no satisfaction in any given answer to meaning.

Personal View (Subjectivist Incoming)

My personal view of the question of the meaning of life is one based in subjectivity: it is possible for people to find their purpose, one which makes them feel satisfied, and which justifies their existence; but whether or not we were given a purpose at the outset of our life is not for me to say. To say this is to assume things true with which I am not satisfied with.

Take for instance the pious man who fervently believes his life is given purpose by god. If someone were to question this purpose, this man becomes upset and keeps trying to justify his belief to the questioner, and perhaps to himself. Now compare this to the woman who believes science can tell us the meaning of life. Trying to convince her otherwise might cause her to become defensive and bring scientific evidence to her defence. I believe this defensiveness to be a form of mental protection, warding out ideas which are not welcomed for they may make you experience unpleasant-ness in the form of existential crises or doubt.

Here is where my point draws from. These people become uncomfortable questioning beyond these foundational beliefs that they have either been told or formulated on their own, given the definition of meaning I have provided above. The pious man and the science advocate are in the same boat as each other; they have found for themselves a convincing (to them) meaning for their life which they can accept. To extend the concept to a universal “meaning of life” seems counter intuitive to what the word meaning connotes to us. It is possible for someone to be content in what appears to be an objective meaning of life, in which case they have found an explanation they are subjectively content with. I wouldn't recommend saying their idea is subjective to them, however. Trying to convince someone who is already convinced in something else is a turbulent endeavour.

Limits to Metaphysical Consideration and Conclusion (Don't think too much about things unless you really want to. The conclusion is in here somewhere too.)

The point made earlier about using your foundational beliefs as a defence against unwanted ideas isn't intended to limit philosophical thoughts on matters you find yourself interested in. Rather, it serves to help us filter out information which we feel we shouldn't bother ourselves with if we already have some form of belief or opinion on the matter with which we feel satisfied. Alternatively, if the explanation of something’s meaning is seemingly insignificant to you then considering its meaning is likely to be subjectively pointless.

In conclusion, this post is meant to convey the thoughts that meaning is found only subjectively, even if you are convinced it is objective because it requires a subjective sense of satisfaction in order for an individual to accept the given meaning as true. We should be aware that people become uncomfortable questioning meaning beyond a certain point. Whether or not there is meaning to absolutely every physical, metaphysical and psychological phenomenon is not relevant to the considerations of this article, only that we can find meaning to things which we find relevant to our interests.

One last point. Should you start to question whether life has meaning or not, it might help you if you consider how relevant to know this is in your day-to-day life. If you can't answer this, then don't worry about it. The meaning of life, as with the meaning of many other complicated ideas, should only be contemplated as long as it causes no intentional distress to either you or others around you. 

As normal, any thoughts on this matter from the readers are entirely welcome! Just click the comment button at the base of this post to do so!

Author:

Clayton de Groot (Wynn)